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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DAVID R. TSCHAGGENY and ELLEN
CHARLENE PRICE TSCHAGGENY,
his wife,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.

No. 14487

UNION PACIFIC LAND RESOURCES
CORPORATION and FRED F.
SAUNDERS,
Defendants and Respondents.

THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Respondents accept generally as sufficient THE NATURE
OF THE CASE as set forth in appellants' brief with the exceptions, however, (1) that respondents claim the "unity of title"
mentioned therein is not the type of unity of title required as
a condition precedent to a finding of easement or way of necessity and (2) that the facts do not support appellants1 contention
that a "public way" existed over respondent Union Pacific Land
Resources Corporation's property.
Respondents accept as sufficient the DISPOSITION IN
THE LOWER COURT as set forth in appellants' brief.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A print depicting the property in question is set
forth below for clarity and convenience in understanding the
pertinent facts involved.
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Defendant Union Pacific Land Resources Corporation
acquired title to the 21.167 acres of property described in
paragraph 2 of plaintiffs1 complaint (Parcels 2, 3, 4, and 5)
by a quitclaim deed dated as of April 1, 1971, from Union
Pacific Railroad Company [Defendants1 Exhibit 8].
Union Pacific Land Resources Corporation's predecessor
in interest, Union Pacific Railroad Company, acquired title to
said 21.167 acres pursuant to a warranty deed (covering Parcels
2 and 4) and a quitclaim deed (covering Parcels 2, 3, 4, and 5)
from Charles W. and Ellen B. Price dated May 13, 1967 [Defendants1
Exhibits 4 and 5, respectively]; a warranty deed (covering Parcel 3) and a quitclaim deed (covering Parcels 2, 3, 4, and 5)
from Marvin C. and Rhea S. Zitting and Lorin C. and Sylvia N.
Zitting dated May 19, 1967; a warranty deed (covering Parcel 5)
and a quitclaim deed (covering Parcels 2, 3, 4, and 5) from
Poulter Lamborn Vault Co.
On May 13, 1967, when Charles W. and Ellen B. Price
executed the warranty deed covering Parcels 2 and 4 and the
quitclaim deed covering Parcels 2, 3, 4, and 5 to Union Pacific
Railroad Company, Prices also owned Parcel 1.

At the time of

those conveyances, Prices believed that they were conveying
to the Railroad Company and that they were being compensated
for said Parcel 1 (Tr. page 207, lines 18-30; page 208, lines
1-10).

-3-
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Union Pacific Railroad Company further perfected its
title to said 21,167 acres of property by instituting a quiet
title proceeding covering said property and by securing a
Decree Quieting Title thereto dated February 5, 1968 [Defendants1 Exhibit 7].

Prices, appellants1 predecessors in interest,

were aware that Union Pacific Railroad Company was instituting
this quiet title action (Tr, page 202, lines 18-26 because they
executed an agreement dated April 17, 1967 [Defendants1 Exhibit
6] wherein they agreed to pay Union Pacific Railroad Company
for all costs incurred in pursuing said action.
By a lease iated June 1, 1967, Union Pacific Railroad
Company leased Parcels 2 and 3 to respondent Fred F. Saunders
(Tr. page 222, lines 18-19).

Approximately one month after

said lease was executed, respondent Saunders placed a lock on
the gate at Second Street (Tr. page 223, lines 6-30; page 224,
line 1). To respondent Saunders knowledge, no one has ever
traversed the alleged, right of way without his permission since
the lock was installed in July of 1967 (Tr. page 224, lines 13-16).
Said lease was subsequently assigned from Union Pacific Railroad
Company to Union Pacific Land Resources Corporation and amended
effective February 1!>, 1974, to cover Parcels 2, 3, and 4.
The easement or way of necessity claimed by appellants
traverses the track bed of the old Utah-Idaho Railroad Company
right of way (Tr. page 236, lines 23-25).

The trackage on this

old right of way was removed about 1948 (Tr. page 236, lines
-4Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Consequently, as pointed out on page 2 of appellants"

brief:
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POINT III
THE ALLEGED EASEMENT OR WAY OF NECESSITY IS CONTRARY
TO THE INTENT OF THE FESPECTIVE PARTIES AT THE TIME OF THE
MAY 13, 1967, CONVEYANCES BY WARRANTY DEED AND BY QUITCLAIM
DEED FROM CHARLES W. AND ELLEN B. PRICE TO UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY.
POINT IV
SINCE ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF ACCESS WAS AND IS AVAILABLE
TO APPELLANTS' PROPERTY, NO NECESSITY EXISTS FOR AN EASEMENT OR
WAY OF NECESSITY.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
RESPONDENT JNION PACIFIC LAND RESOURCES CORPORATION'S
PREDECESSOR IN INTEREST, UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, DID
EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO PERFECT ITS TITLE TO THE ENTIRE 21.167ACRE PARCEL AND TO EXTINGUISH ANY EASEMENTS AND/OR RIGHTS OF
WAY AFFECTING THE SAME.
Respondent Union Pacific Land Resources Corporation's
predecessor in interest, Union Pacific Railroad Company, secured
from Prices, appellants' predecessors in interest, a warranty
deed dated May 13, 1967, conveying title to Parcels 2 and 4
"subject to existing easements and rights of way of record"
[Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1].

In this regard, no evidence was adduced

at trial of any easement or right of way of record (Tr. page
203, lines 6-21).

On May 13, 1967, Union Pacific Railroad Com:

-6-
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presently have any legal or practical basis whatsoever to
assert any title or interest to such an easement or right of
way.
POINT II
THE REQUISITE "UNITY OF TITLE" DID NOT EXIST IN
CHARLES W. AND ELLEN B. PRICE ON MAY 13, 19 67, THE DATE OF
THE CONVEYANCES BY WARRANTY DEED AND BY QUITCLAIM DEED OF THE
PROPERTY UNDERLYING MERELY A PORTION OF THE ALLEGED EASEMENT
OR WAY OF NECESSITY.
Appellants, throughout their brief, point out that
one of the legal requirements which must be satisfied in order
to establish a way of necessity is "unity of title followed by
severance".

Morris v. Blunt, 49 Utah 243 at 254, 161 Pac. 1127

(1916); Savage v. Nielsen, 114 Utah 22 at 31, 197 P.2d 117
(1948); Chournos v. Alkema, 27 Utah 2d 244 at 247, 494 P.2d 950
(1972).
In Savage v. Nielsen, supra, the Utah Supreme Court
states at pp. 31-32:
The theory upon which a way of necessity is based is that all the property is
once owned by a single person. He divides
it into two tracts and conveys away one
tract. The physical location of the other
tract is such that it is not reasonably
accessible without crossing the tract conveyed away." If the grantor retains the
tract which is thus surrounded, without
any mention of a way, it is presumed that
he intended to reserve a right of way to and
from the tract retained. If he sells the
tract which is thus surrounded without men-8Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

tion of a means of"ingress and egress
ii is presumed that he intended to
create a servient estate in himself to
the extent of a right of way in favor
of the other tract of land. The requirements for a way of necessity are set out
in the case of Morris v. B l u n t , 49 Utah ••'•
21?,
<:: ~ ~ \ ? 7 , 1 ] 3 2 , "as follows:
"•
ance ;

of title followed by sever-

11

- , rhdL dc the time of the severance
the servitude w a s a p p a r e n t , o b v i o u s , and
visible;
"
* •
*:he easement Is reasonably
necessary to the enjoyment of the dominant
estate? an,"(4; It must usually be continuous and
self-acting, as distinguished from one
used only from time to time when occasion
arises."
See a , s. • i Ad a ins o i I x B r o c kb an R,, 112
Utar: "-2, ib: ?.2d 2 6 4 ; citing M o r r i s v.
Blunt... and reaffirming requirement number
three a b o v e , and discussing generally the
doctrine of easements by implication, and
reasonable necessity; Smith v. S a n d e r s , 1 12
Utah 5 1 7 , 189 P.2d 7 0 1 , Fayter v. N o r t h , 30
• Utah 15 6, 83 P. 7 4 2 , 6 L.R.A., N . S . , 410',
It is apparent t h e n , from an analysis
of the above r e q u i r e m e n t s , that the d o c trine had its basis in the theory of a
•grant by reason of the circumstances attendant at the time of the grant. It is inconsistent with the adversity contemplated
in the theory of an easement based upon
pre — -1-*! ption.
A way of necessity arises from the
existence of such necessity a : the time
the dividing of the property, . . .
[Emphasis added.]

-9Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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At the time of the conveyances to Union Pacific Railroad Company in 1967, the property underlying the alleged easement or way of necessity was owned in part by Zittings and in
part by Prices as depicted on the print.

In short, there was

no "unity of title" in the property underlying the alleged
easement or way of necessity at the time appellants' predecessors
in interest (Prices) conveyed Parcel 2 to Union Pacific Railroad
i
Company.
The "unity of title", however, that appellants attempt
to rely upon is that unity which may or may not have existed
when the property in question was all purportedly owned by
Utah-Idaho Central Railroad.

i

The difficulty with this position

is that appellants dur:.ng trial never established that any such
4

unity of title ever existed in the Utah-Idaho Central Railroad.
Furthermore, even if unity of title did exist in the Utah-Idaho
Central Railroad, appellants did not and cannot establish that
4

at the time of severance, if any, the claimed servitude was
apparent, obvious, and visible.

This is particularly true since

the alleged easement "is right on the bed of the old Utah-Idaho
Central Railroad" (Tr. page 236, lines 23-25), which trackage
wasn't removed until 1948 (Tr. page 236, lines 26-28) at or
about the same time Prices' predecessors in interest acquired
title to Parcel 2 (see the first sentence of appellants' STATEMENT OF FACTS).

Consequently, if the trackage overlying the

alleged easement wasn't, removed until or near the date Prices
-10Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

obtained title thereto, it is impossible for any servitude
(other than as a railroad right of way) to have been established
prior to Prices1 acquisition of Parcel 2.

In summary, the

severance of the property, if any, occurred prior to the establishment of any servitude for any purpose other than as a railroad right of way.
The only point in time when any question of severance
could be raised by appellants would be the 1967 conveyances
from Prices to Union Pacific Railroad Company; however, at that
time, there was no unity of title in the property underlying
the alleged easement or right of way of necessity.

Such property

was owned in part by Prices and in part by Zittings.

Nowhere

in the record did appellants ever establish any unity of title
to, or a severance of, that property underlying the entire
length of the alleged easement or way of necessity.
In order to establish an easement or way of necessity,
appellants must also establish that such easement was "continuous
and self-acting, as distinguished from one used only from time
to time when occasion arises".
page 31.

Savage v. Nielsen, supra at

Since the gate at Second Street was locked in July of

1967 (Tr. page 223, lines 6-30; page 224, line 1) and since
respondent Saunders doesn't have any knowledge of anyone gaining
access through said gate without his permission (Tr. page 224,
lines 13-16), the evidence reveals that appellants have not
traversed the area in question since July of 1967.
-11Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Consequently,

appellants clearly cannot establish the requisite "continuous
and self-acting" use*
POINT III
THE ALLEGED EASEMENT OR WAY OF NECESSITY IS CONTRARY
TO THE INTENT OF THE FlESPECTIVE PARTIES AT THE TIME OF THE

j

MAY 13, 1967, CONVEYANCES BY WARRANTY DEED AND BY QUITCLAIM
DEED FROM CHARLES W. PND ELLEN B. PRICE TO UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY.
One of appellants' predecessors in interest/ Charles
W. Price, testified that in 1967, when the warranty deed and
quitclaim deed were executed, he understood and believed that
Union Pacific Railroad Company had purchased and compensated him
for Parcel 1 in addition to Parcels 2 and 4 (Tr. page 207, lines
18-25; page 208, lines 5-10).

Furthermore, Mr. Price testified

that he knew Union Pacific Railroad Company was purchasing his
property for the purpose of constructing a number of warehouses
i

and tracks thereon (Tr, page 204, lines 3-28) , which use would
conflict substantially with any alleged easement or way of
necessity.

Consequently, it is clear that at the time of the

i
1967 conveyances, Prices never intended to reserve any easement and/or right of way.

See Watkins v. Simonds, 11 Utah 2d

46, 354 P.2d 852 (1960), where the Supreme Court quotes with
approval from the Restatement of Law on Real Property, § 476
at page 49:
«

-12Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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An easement created by implication
arises as an inference of the intention
of the parties to a conveyance of land.
The inference is drawn from the circumstances under which the conveyance was
made rather than the language of the
conveyance. To draw the inference of
intention from such circumstances, they
(the circumstances) must be or must be
assumed to be within the knowledge of
the parties. The inference drawn represents an attempt to ascribe an intention
to parties who had not thought or had
not bothered to put the intention into
words, or perhaps more often, to parties
who actually had formed no intention
conscious to themselves. [Emphasis added.]
POINT IV
SINCE ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF ACCESS WAS AND IS AVAILABLE
TO APPELLANTS' PROPERTY, NO NECESSITY EXISTS FOR AN EASEMENT OR
WAY OF NECESSITY.
Respondents introduced into evidence a photograph
identified as Defendants1 Exhibit 2 secured in October of 1966
(Tr. page 232, lines 26-30; page 233,.lines 1-30) which verifies
that approximately seven months prior to the conveyances from
Prices to Union Pacific Railroad Company in May of 1967 an
alternate means of access existed into appellants1 property
from Second Street in Ogden.

That photograph depicts a well-

defined roadway to the east of the 21.167 acres in question
and an automobile situated in close proximity to appellants1
south property line.

Furthermore, respondent Sanders testified

that he had traversed at least a portion of this alternate
roadway several times (Tr. page 225, lines 4-30; page 226, lines
1-13).
-13-
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i

If a landowner has other reasonable means of acquiring
access to his land, he cannot acquire an implied easement of
way by necessity, Frazier v. Bobbitt, 526 P.2d 1343 (Colo. 1974).
Furthermore, the court in Ewan v. Stenberg, 541 P.2d 60 (Mont.
1975), stated at p. 63:
The crux of this claim is the question
of whether the requisite necessity does
or does not exist. . . . The fact is
that the plaintiffs do have other ways
of access tc and from Tract B. The
fact that the other ways involved longer
distances ar.d more inconvenience is not
an acceptable basis upon which to grant
the relief requested. The criterion is
not one of convenience, but of necessity.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the uncontroverted facts and the applicable
law involved, it is evident that appellants have no legal title
or interest whatsoever in or to Parcels 2, 3, 4, and 5.

If any

such title or interest: was enjoyed by appellants1 predecessors
in interest prior to the 1967 warranty deed and quitclaim deed
from Charles W. and Ellen B. Price to Union Pacific Railroad
Company and the 1968 Decree Quieting Title, all such rights
either merged into Union Pacific Railroad Company's fee simple
title or were extinguished thereby.
Appellants never established the requisite "unity of
title followed by severance" as a condition precedent to establishing an easement or way of necessity.

As Judge Calvin Gould

stated in his Memorandum Decision dated December 24, 1975,
following trial of this case:
-14Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The fact that•no prescriptive
right exists makes the question of an
easement of necessity a moot question.
This is because an easement of necessity
is simply an easement implied in law to
reserve access to a property retained
by a grantor on the assumption that the
grantor would not have conveyed without
reserving a right-of-way. Here there
was nothing in the nature of a right to
be reserved. The essential ingredient
to a way of necessity is that the grantor
had access to either (1) a public way or
(2) other property which he owned or had
rights in. Neither exists in this case.
Appellants' allegation of easement or way of necessity is contrary to the intent of the respective parties to
the warranty deed and quitclaim deed dated May 13, 1967, between
Charles W. and Ellen B. Price and Union Pacific Railroad Company.
Furthermore, since alternative means of access was available to
appellants1 property at the time of the 1967 conveyances, no
necessity existed for an easement or way of necessity as contended
by appellants.
Based upon the foregoing, respondents respectfully
request that the decision of the lower court be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

SN A. GOOfiSELL
Attorney for Defendants-Respondents
Union Pacific Land Resources
Corporation and Fred F. Saunders
600 Union Pacific Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the JtT

day of May, 1976,

I served by mailing, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Brief of Defendants-Respondents to LaMar
Duncan, attorney for plaintiffs-appellants, 706 Phillips
Petroleum Building, Sc.lt Lake City, Utah

84101.
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